Journal of International Economic Law Advance Access originally published online on February 1, 2008
Journal of International Economic Law 2008 11(1):135-154; doi:10.1093/jiel/jgm046
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© Oxford University Press 2008, all rights reserved
Conceptualizing Security Exceptions: Legal Doctrine or Political Excuse?
* Articled Clerk, Baker & McKenzie, Melbourne, Australia. All errors and omissions, as well as the opinions expressed here, are mine.
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The dominant world political theory for international engagement has long been Realism, where state power and state interests are viewed as determining the limits on state relations. Increasingly, however, new theories have emerged to assist our understanding of how and why states interact in a global setting dominated by international institutions and their antecedent agreements. This is no more apparent than in the field of international economic relations under the control of the World Trade Organization. Using political and legal theories, this essay explores whether WTO security exceptions are legal doctrines or political excuses and how this informs our present, and possibly future, understanding of international state interaction.