© 2002 by Oxford University Press
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WTO Dispute Settlement as Judicial Supervision
1 Department of International Relations, University of Tokyo
This article distinguishes ‘judicial supervision’ and ‘dispute settlement’. Judicial supervision is a mechanism to control and secure compliance of international obligations undertaken by States by judicial means. Its notable feature is that States which have not been injured directly may initiate judicial proceedings for the purpose of putting an end to violations of international obligations by another State. This article compares the dispute settlement procedures in the WTO with those in the ICJ, and demonstrates that the WTO procedures have the character of judicial supervision. It also focuses on the position assigned to third States by the WTO and the ICJ, and shows that the WTO allows participation of third States in its adjudicatory process much more liberally than the ICJ. A WTO member can bring a complaint to the WTO, even if it has suffered no injury in a concrete and material sense. Multiple disputes involving more than two States are a regular feature in the WTO. Third party intervention is virtually automatically allowed. It could be suggested that the WTO allows participation of third States in its adjudicatory process liberally because compulsory jurisdiction has been achieved and because the WTO adjudicatory procedures have the character of judicial supervision. The WTO and ICJ procedures are both judicial, but they differ considerably in character.