© 2004 by Oxford University Press
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General Article |
WTO Regulation of Subsidies to State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) A Critical Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol
Assistant Professor, Wayne State University Law School, Detroit, USA. Email: ya.qin{at}wayne.edu
The existence of a large number of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China and government subsidies to them has caused much concern among its trading partners. The Protocol on China's Accession to the WTO sets out certain provisions directly or indirectly addressing this concern. Among them are the provisions of an SOE-based specificity test and authorization for the importing country to use, on a permanent basis, alternative benchmarks in identifying and calculating Chinese subsidies. In addition, the Protocol excludes China from invoking the privatization exception available to developing country members under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. This article provides a critical analysis of the Protocol approach towards the issue of SOE subsidies and examines its implications for economic reform in China and for the WTO legal system.