Journal of International Economic Law Advance Access originally published online on November 3, 2006
Journal of International Economic Law 2006 9(4):837-864; doi:10.1093/jiel/jgl031
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The Consistency of WTO Rules: Can the Single Undertaking Be Squared with Variable Geometry?
* Craig VanGrasstek is Executive Director, Program on Trade and Negotiations, John F. Kennedy School of Government (Harvard University), an Adjunct Associate Professor in the Walsh School of Foreign Service (Georgetown University), and President of Washington Trade Reports. His e-mail address is tradeprof{at}aol.com.
** Pierre Sauvé is a Research Associate at the International Trade Policy Unit of the London School of Economics and a non-resident Senior Research Fellow and faculty member at the World Trade Institute, in Berne, Switzerland. His e-mail address is pisauve{at}hotmail.com.
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Abstract |
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The diversity of countries that negotiate commitments in the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the distinctions between their legal and constitutional systems, implies important differences in how agreements are approved, implemented, and enforced. Although consistency is among the desirable attributes to which the multilateral trading system should strive, it cannot be achieved at the expense of all other desiderata. Among the reasons for relaxation of this goal is the need to accommodate the different legal systems and levels of economic development among Member States, as well as the demands for flexibility in negotiations. This paper reviews the development and current status of the debate over consistency in the multilateral system, with special emphasis on the perspectives of three different sets of participants: the United States, the European Union (EU), and developing countries. In the trade-off between the depth and the width of the trading system, the paper asks whether WTO Members should be more interested in expanding the scope of globally agreed rules or in securing countries’ adherence to them? It explores the possible consequences for the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) if the US Congress cannot be convinced to make a new grant of trade promotion authority (TPA) after the current one expires. It also discusses whether the single undertaking should continue to shape the terms of the DDA. In discussing the WTO’s approach to decision-making and the possible need for reforms thereto, the paper also considers how best and on what grounds should new issues be introduced on the negotiating agenda. The paper argues that whether or not the DDA is conducted on the basis of a single undertaking, and with or without TPA, the multilateral trading system will continue to provide for less than full consistency.