Skip Navigation


Journal of International Economic Law Advance Access originally published online on May 12, 2006
Journal of International Economic Law 2006 9(2):293-323; doi:10.1093/jiel/jgl009
This Article
Right arrow Full Text
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow All Versions of this Article:
9/2/293    most recent
jgl009v1
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Similar articles in ISI Web of Science
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrow Search for citing articles in:
ISI Web of Science (2)
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Bhattacharjea, A.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
 Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

Journal of International Economic Law Vol. 9 No. 2 © Oxford University Press 2006, all rights reserved

The Case for a Multilateral Agreement on Competition Policy: A Developing Country Perspective

Aditya Bhattacharjea*

* Reader (Associate Professor), Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi, Delhi 110007, India. E-mail: aditya{at}econdse.org.

Although the issue of trade and competition policy has been dropped from the Work Programmes of the Doha Round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations, it continues to be discussed in other fora and may return to the WTO after the completion of the Round. This article assesses the case for an agreement from the perspective of developing countries. It begins by reviewing the ‘development dimension’ of the WTO debate and then examines three specific antitrust issues that were of considerable relevance to developing countries but were not pursued: export cartels, anti-dumping and intellectual property rights (IPRs). There follows a critical assessment of the empirical and theoretical arguments for the kind of agreement that was being advocated to deal with international cartels. Alternative proposals, involving developing countries ‘outsourcing’ antitrust enforcement to developed countries, are also sceptically examined, as is the relevance for developing countries of the kind of competition policy that is currently in place in developed countries. Finally, a general approach to international trade agreements suggests that developing countries had nothing to gain from the proposal that was on the table, and the article concludes by proposing a range of more suitable alternatives.


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?




Disclaimer:
Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.