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Journal of International Economic Law Advance Access published online on April 28, 2007
Journal of International Economic Law, doi:10.1093/jiel/jgm008
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© Oxford University Press 2007, all rights reserved

Independence Under Fire: Extra-legal Pressures and Coalition Building in WTO Dispute Settlement

John Maton and Carolyn Maton*

*John Maton is a trainee solicitor with Trowers and Hamlins, London, and an MSc graduate of the Department of Political Science/School of Public Policy, University College London. Carolyn Maton is a junior doctor, and an MA and MB/Bchir graduate of Clare College, University of Cambridge.


  Abstract

This study uses detailed quantitative analyses of the complete history of rulings made by the Panels and the Appellate Body of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism during its first ten years of operation, to assess the robustness of theories regarding the decision-making of these institutions. Regression analyses are used to test for correlation between the success of Complainants in dispute settlement and a variety of factors, representing the hypothesized capacity of states to influence Panels and the Appellate Body through dimensions of political and economic power, the impact of the relative practical capacities of states in dispute settlement proceedings, and the formation of coalitions of states in support of a particular Complainant or Respondent. The results of the regression analyses – that few significant correlations exist between the independent variables and the dispute outcomes – provide evidence that the judicial institutions of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism are independent from Member State influence. The one reliable correlation found in these analyses demonstrates that a Complainant state does have substantial advantage in Panel proceedings if it has previously participated in more disputes than the Respondent.

The authors’ thanks are due to Dr David Coen and Dr Fabio Franchino of the Department of Political Science/School of Public Policy, University College London for their invaluable help with the development of the model and theoretical basis of the work; to Dr Deborah Cass of the London School of Economics and Political Science and Prof Catherine Redgwell of University College London for interviews and comments which greatly assisted the authors’ research into the WTO system; to Arun Venkataraman of the USTR, formerly of the Appellate Body Secretariat, WTO, for help with data collection; and to three anonymous reviewers whose helpful comments have informed revisions made to this article. Any errors remain the responsibility of the authors alone. For questions or comments, the authors can be contacted at Email: john.maton{at}hotmail.co.uk.


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