Journal of International Economic Law Advance Access published online on March 10, 2009
Journal of International Economic Law, doi:10.1093/jiel/jgp010
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© Oxford University Press 2009, all rights reserved
The WTO Appellate Body's Exercise of Judicial Economy
Correspondence: *Colombian lawyer, University of Ottawa. E-mail: aalva076{at}uottawa.ca.
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Abstract |
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The concept of judicial economy is well accepted in World Trade Organization (WTO) litigation, and it stands for the proposition that WTO panels do not need to rule on every single claim made by complaining parties, only on those required to settle the dispute in question. However, little has been discussed about the possibility of the Appellate Body's; exercising judicial economy itself. Article 17.12 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) seems to prevent the existence of judicial economy at the appeal level by providing that ‘the Appellate Body shall address each of the issues raised in accordance with paragraph 6 during appellate proceeding’.1 However, despite this understanding of the scope of Article 17.12, held by some of the original members, the Appellate Body began freeing itself from a strict reading of this provision, and in its report in United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, without any these members on the bench, made a clear statement in this regard. The article illustrates the types of judicial economy the Appellate Body is exerting, highlights its exceptional character and shows its implications for parties and for the adjudication of WTO disputes.